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This paper suggests that Bacon offers an Augustinian (rather than a purely
Stoic) model of the “culture of the mind.” He applies this conception to natu-
ral philosophy in an original way, and his novel application is informed by
two related theological concerns. First, the Fall narrative provides a connec-
tion between the cultivation of the mind and the cultivation of the earth, both
of which are seen as restorative of an original condition. Second, the fruit of
the cultivation of the mind is the virtue of charity, which is understood not
only as curing the mind of the individual, but as contributing to human wel-
fare and ameliorating some of the material losses that resulted from the Fall.
In the autumn of one of the last years of his life Augustine delivered a ser-
mon on the parable of the vineyard (Matthew 20: 1–16). The agricultural
setting of this story afforded him the opportunity to rework a motif famil-
iar to him and his educated auditors—Cicero’s celebrated formulation
cultura . . . animi philosophia est (Tusculanae disputations 2.5.13). Cicero had
likened the uneducated individual (animus sine doctrina) to uncultivated
land, before going on to identify philosophy as the means through which
the mind should be cultivated.1 For Augustine, however, it was not the
spiritual exercises of pagan philosophy that wrought the culture of the
mind: rather it is God who cultivates us as the farmer cultivates his ªeld,
rooting out bad weeds with his word, opening up hearts with the plough
of his doctrine, planting the seeds of devotion, and waiting for the fruits
to appear. Playing upon the various senses of the verb colere—from which
our contemporary expressions “cult,” “culture,” “cultivation,” and “colo-
nialism” all ultimately derive—Augustine also suggested that God culti-
1. For the ancient tradition of philosophy as therapy see Nussbaum, 1994, 1986,
pp. 31–74; Sorabji 2002, Fitzgerald 2008.
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vates us, and we cultivate (worship) him: colimus enim deum, et colit nos deus
(Augustine, Sermon 81.7, 1997–2000 vol. III/3, pp. 407f. [PL 38, cols.
530–1]).2
Augustine’s adaptation of the idea of cultivation and his attribution to
the Deity of the central role in the process was in some tension with the
Ciceronian notion of moral formation through the exercise of personal ef-
fort. For Augustine, without divine grace all efforts at self-improvement
were destined to failure. While the philosophers might have had a dim ap-
prehension of our moral inadequacies, they were bereft of the resources to
redress them. Integral to Augustine’s new prescription for the cure of the
mind, therefore, is a redescription of the Stoic diagnosis of its ills: Stoic
perturbations (Lat. perturbatio; Gk. ©") were recast in terms of Chris-
tian ideas of temptation and sin (Sorabji 2002; Colish 1985, pp. 142–
238). Ultimately, sin could only be overcome with divine assistance, and
its complete eradication would be postponed until a future life. Augustine
also complicated the Stoic picture by placing the will, rather than reason,
at the centre of his account, and by allowing a legitimate place for the pas-
sions in the well-ordered life (Sorabji 2002; Bouwsma 1975; Gaukroger
1998, pp. 1–14). This was not simply a re-described psychology based on
introspection, moreover, for it drew heavily on the biblical account of the
Fall. According to Augustine, as a consequence of the primeval tempta-
tion and subsequent fall of Adam, the human will is enslaved by sin. The
historical origin of sin had no counterpart in the Stoic account of pertur-
bations, but for Augustine it provided a key insight into the human con-
dition. At the very least, the inherited malady of the mind that results
from sin is such that the resources of philosophy are altogether too weak to
effect a cure—partly because philosophy had never correctly identiªed the
source of the mind’s ills, partly because without divine grace no human
regimen is sufªciently potent. It is in this sense that we are to understand
Augustine’s insistence that Christianity is the one true philosophy and
that it offers the only efªcacious medicine of the mind (Contra Julianum,
4.72 [PL 44. 774]).3
Owing to the pervasive inºuence of Augustinian thought, the Latin
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2. Augustine himself points to the polyvalent nature of the word colere. City of God,
Bk X, ch. 1. See also Williams 1976; Niedermann 194; Markus 1993. For other Patristic
uses of the “cultivation” motif see, e.g., Origen, The Song of Songs, Commentary and Homilies
III.10; John Cassian, Conferences 1.xxii; Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations 42. 4.
3. In De Vera Religione 24.45 Augustine explains that Scripture contains the medicine of
the soul, and replaces the tree in the Garden of Eden. Augustine nonetheless retains a place
for disciplina in the medicining of the mind. De Moribus 1.28.55–56. For Augustine on the
cure of souls see Kolbet 2010.
West came to understand redemption in terms of the healing of a fallen
human nature. (Eastern Christianity, by way of contrast, saw the goals of
the religious life more positively in terms of theosis or the union of the soul
with God.) Accordingly, Augustine’s view of the cultivation of the soul
tended to predominate during the Middle Ages. Anselm of Canterbury, in
an extended gloss on I Corinthians 3:9 (Dei agricultura estis—you are God’s
husbandry), points out that human hearts, left to themselves, bring forth
nothing useful. However, when seeds planted from scripture are cultivated
by the Holy Spirit, human souls progress towards salvation (De concordia
3.6). Aquinas also rehearsed the Augustinian conception, while other me-
dieval authors took up Augustine’s imaginative conºation of cult and cul-
tivation, speaking of the cultura Christi and cultura Dei (Aquinas, Summa
theologiae 2a2ae. 81, 1; Catena Aurea vol. 2, part 2; Bonaventure 2007,
p. 758). These images were reinforced by depictions of Christ in material
culture: Jesus appears as a gardener in paintings and biblical illustrations,
on misericords and in coloured glass, often bearing tools for digging and
planting (Otten 1985, p. 14). The characteristically Augustinian position,
sharpened by the controversy with Pelagius, that virtue is cultivated in
the soul by God rather than by human effort, also found its way into the
well-known formulations of Lombard and Aquinas: “Virtue is a good
quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can
make bad use, which God works in us, without us” (Lombard, Sent.,
2.27.1, Aquinas, Summa theologia 1a2ae. 55, 4. Cf. Augustine, De Libero
Arbitrio II, 19). Virtues are infused, rather than acquired (as Aristotle had
it). In addition to virtues, Aquinas speaks of gifts, beatitudes, and fruits—
the latter drawing on the notion of “fruits of the spirit,” but also calling to
mind the metaphors of cultivation of the virtues (Aquinas, Summa
theologiae 2a2ae. 47–170; Gal. 5:22–3).
From about the end of the ªfteenth century, however, we witness the
beginning of the ºourishing of Neostoicism, and along with it elements of
the Ciceronian conception of cultura animi. This reappearance prompts two
questions: ªrst is the general question about the context of the revival of
Stoic thought, and how early modern writers dealt with the incipient ten-
sion between Stoic and Christian moral ideals, represented respectively by
Cicero and Augustine.4 The second question bears directly on the theme of
this paper: how did Bacon appropriate this tradition and what were his
likely sources?
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4. This issue is complicated by the fact that aspects of Stoic thought had been incorpo-
rated into Patristic writings and, arguably, even the New Testament itself. See Colish
1985, vol. 2, pp. 142–238.
Mental Disciplines and the Disciplinary Society
One important element of the historical context of the rise of Neostoicism
was what Charles Taylor has recently described as “the rise of a disciplin-
ary society” (Taylor 2007, pp. 90–145). While Taylor is the most recent to
have drawn our attention to this feature of the early modern West, for
some time, and in various ways, historians have mounted similar argu-
ments. The basic idea is that at the dawn of modernity we see in Western
Christendom a drive to reform society, to demand that the whole of hu-
man society be held to higher standards. Jean Delumeau (1977), for exam-
ple, has contended that in the early modern period religious elites, Catho-
lic and Protestant alike, sought to extend to the general populace a
religious discipline that once had been the preserve of monastic communi-
ties. These attempts reached their zenith at the turn of the eighteenth cen-
tury. The prelude to this development, according to Delumeau, was the
“culpabilisation” of Western culture—a widespread inculcation of a deep
sense of guilt and culpability (Delumeau 1983). This was followed, by the
“Christianization” of Europe, which in turn eventually provoked the reac-
tions of the Enlightenment. Neostoic ideals of the cultivation of the mind
or the medicining of the mind found a congenial home in this new social
context.
Another aspect of the broader context of the rise of Neostoicism is the
religious conºict that followed in the wake of the Protestant reformation.
In his inºuential De constantia in publicis malis (On Constancy, 1584), Flem-
ish humanist Justus Lipsius sought to fuse Stoicism and Christianity in
such a way that it would offer solace to individuals living through the
tribulations of a Europe riven by sectarian disputes and internecine wars.5
This constancy was to be achieved through establishing the rule of reason
over passions and false judgements. This moral programme would have
the dual consequence of serving both as a private consolation for living in
times of turmoil, and as a partial prophylactic against the social and polit-
ical conditions that gave rise to that turmoil in the ªrst place. This biva-
lent character of the project is evident in Lipsius’s insistence that good
citizenship is a key ingredient of the moral life of the individual (De con-
stantia I.12). More broadly, his transformation of Stoic fate into divine
providence and his subtle modiªcation of the Stoic virtue of apatheia, of-
fered a model of how Stoicism could be reconciled with Christianity. This
model resonated with elements of both Calvinism and Catholicism.
Lipsius’s reference to “good citizens” points us towards the fact that an-
other, well attested manifestation of the disciplinary society was the emer-
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5. For the impact of Lipsius in England, see McCrea 1997. On the inºuence of Stoicism
more generally see Todd 1983; Chew 1988; Jalobeanu 2008.
gence of the modern state, where polities were given to instituting much
tighter moral control of the activities of their citizens. Gerhard Oestereich
argues that Neostoic ideals were integral to early modern states, which
were characterised by the imposition of order from above by means of state
bureaucracy. This imposition was frequently reinforced “from below,” as it
were, by Calvinism and pietism (Oestereich 1982, pp. 72f.). Philip Gorski
has similarly linked a “disciplinary revolution” in early modern Europe to
the rise of the state. He, too, points to the role played by Neostoic philoso-
phy, but argues (in a manner somewhat redolent of Weber) that Calvinism
and Pietism were even more signiªcant factors. For this reason, he argues,
the disciplinary society was established far more effectively in countries
inºuenced by Calvinism than in Lutheran and Catholic territories (Gorski
2003). In these polities, we see a classic Augustinian understanding of the
state with its coercive powers as a divinely ordained instrument for the
control of fallen human beings (Augustine, City of God XII.27; Nederman
1988; Hankins 1990, vol. 1, pp. 142f., 227–32).
Clearly, then, Neostoicism seems to have signiªcant implications for
moral and political philosophy in the early modern period, and there is a
body of secondary literature that addresses these connexions. But what
about natural philosophy? One possible avenue of investigation is to con-
sider what might be called the regimens of experimental natural philoso-
phy, understood as involving a distinctive kind of mental discipline—one
that bridges the philosophical, moral, and scientiªc realms. We get inti-
mations of this in natural philosophical discourse in Descartes’ emphasis
on “rules” and “method” and in Robert Hooke’s talk of the need for “me-
thodical proceedings in the making experiments and observations.”6 The
insight that the notion of a cultura animi might be applied to natural phi-
losophy offers one way of locating the emergence of modern science within
this broader context of the move for moral reform in early modern Europe.
The emergence of an experimental natural philosophy, in other words, can
be related to the rise of the disciplinary society and, indeed, might repre-
sent one of its enduring legacies. Related to this is the way in which the
seventeenth century witnesses a partial revision of the Augustinian priori-
ties in relation to the culture of the mind. Augustine, we recall, contended
that the real cultura animi is Christian religion. However, part of the sub-
text of Lipsius’s De constantia was that religion was not the cure for pertur-
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6. Hence Descartes’ Regulae ad directionem ingenii (Rules for the Direction of the Mind,
1626–1628) and Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la vérité dans les
sciences (Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the
Sciences, 1637); and Robert Hooke’s “A General Scheme, or Idea of the Present State of Nat-
ural Philosophy, and how its defects may be remedied by a methodical proceeding in the
making experiments and collecting observations,” posthumously published in 1705.
bations of the soul but, given the current historical predicament, one of
their chief causes. The idea that natural philosophy might play this role is
consistent with the descriptions we ªnd offered for the goals of natural phi-
losophy in Cicero’s De ªnibus. Here the Epicurean spokesman Torquatus
makes this claim for natural philosophy: “knowledge of the facts of nature
relieves us of the burden of superstition, frees us from fear of death, and
shields us against the disturbing effects of ignorance which is often in itself
a cause of terrifying apprehensions” (I.19.64). As we have already noted, for
Cicero superstitio was characterized by excessive fear of the gods and this,
broadly speaking, is relevant to Delumeau’s claims about the increasing
“culpabilisation” of the early modern West. Natural philosophy—albeit
one that assumed an intimate relation between the individual and the
kosmos—thus provides a means of achieving freedom from fear and super-
stition.
Bacon, too, will speak of necessary cures for superstition, and his re-
peated advocacy of charity as a religious virtue that admits no excess is
highly signiªcant in this context (OFB XV, p. 39; Le Doeuff 1991,
p. 327).7 But his initial interest seems to be natural history and natural
philosophy, and the possibility that they might be reformed by the culture
of the mind. (Indeed, in a move that places Bacon at some distance from
Torquatus, nature itself is to be reformed in the process as well.) One sug-
gestion is that Novum organum offers this kind of programme. But it is in
the Advancement of Learning, where it is presented as a component of moral
philosophy, that Bacon begins the systematic development of the cultura
animi theme.
Bacon and the Cultura Animi
Bacon’s use of elements of the cultura animi tradition has already been
noted by others, most interestingly in relation to how his treatment of this
moral theme might be related to his natural philosophical programme
(Corneanu 2011, Jalobeanu 2010). My aim in this section is to give a brief
overview of Bacon’s use of the tradition, and to draw out what I believe to
be some of its distinctive features. Bacon’s earliest references to the culti-
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7. Later apologists for the Royal Society will take up the theme, explicitly identifying
natural philosophy as the cure for perturbations of the mind and religious sectarianism.
Thus Thomas Sprat: “The Real Philosophy will supply our thoughts with excellent Medi-
cines, against their own Extravagancies, and will serve in some sort, for the same ends which
the Moral professes to accomplish . . . it will certainly have a surer effect in the composing,
and purifying of their thoughts, than all the rigid praecepts of the Stoical, or the empty
distinctions of the Peripatetic Moralists.” (Sprat 1667, p. 341, cf. pp. 358f.). Also see
Glanvill 1668, pp. 146–8; 1671, p. 46. For more extensive discussions see Corneanu 2011,
ch. 3; Jalobeanu 2010; Harrison 2011.
vation of the mind come in his epistolary “Advice to the Earl of Rutland
on his Travels,” probably written in the 1690s. Here Bacon commends to
the appropriately named Roger Manners “that which in moral philosophy
we call ‘cultum animi’, the tilling and manuring of you own mind.” Ba-
con goes on to offer what in many respects seems to be a standard Stoic ad-
vocacy of self control, emphasizing “unmovable constancy and a freedom
from the passions, which are indeed sicknesses of the mind.” He hints that
the Stoic goal of the extirpation of the passions was extreme, and notes the
necessity for divine grace. But tellingly he also notes that philosophy,
the handmaid of divinity, does not condemn “care and industry” in the
business of self-mastery (Bacon [1596] 2002, pp. 69, 70).
Bacon takes up the idea of cultura animi again in the Advancement of
Learning, in the context of a discussion of moral philosophy (rather than
natural history or natural philosophy). The ªrst explicit occurrence is a
reference to the “Georgics of the mind”8:
And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to write at leisure
that which men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and sub-
orn Action and active life, these Georgics of the mind concerning
husbandry & tillage thereof, are no lesse worthy then the heroical
descriptions of vertue, duty & felicity wherefore the maine & primi-
tive division of Morall knowledge seemeth to be in the Exemplar or
Platforme of Good, and the Regiment or Culture of the Mind; The
one describing the nature of Good the other prescribing rules how
to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.
(OFB IV, p. 135)
Bacon contends that the deªciency of the ancients’ moral philosophy lay
in their over-emphasis on the ªrst part of this task—i.e. descriptions of
the good, rather than the means of attaining it (echoing Aristotle’s cri-
tique of Plato in Nicomachean Ethics II.2). In De augmentis he adds that
Christian moral philosophy is superior in this respect. Thus while ele-
ments of pagan moral philosophy were to be greatly admired, “yet so as
the pious and earnest diligence of divines, which has been employed in
weighing and determining duties, moral virtues, cases of conscience, the
bounds of sin, and the like, has left the philosophers far behind” (SEH IX,
p. 195).9 In the Advancement, he goes on to say that the philosophers of an-
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8. This is preceded in earlier sections, however, by references to the “diseases of the
mind” and their “remedies” (OFB IV, pp. 12, 50, 87–88, 95). The idea that Virgil’s Geor-
gics might have inºuenced Bacon’s programme is brieºy explored in Low 1983. See also
Patterson 1992, pp. 134–8 and De Bruyn 2004.
9. Interestingly, Bacon’s additions to De augmentis (an expanded Latin version of the Ad-
vancement) often stress what is distinctively Christian about his position. The “cases of con-
tiquity were far too sanguine in the estimation of our moral capacities,
proposing a far “higher elevation of man’s nature” than matched the real-
ity. Bacon here alludes to Seneca’s typically Stoic assertion that part of the
greatness of man was to be attributed to the god-like element in the hu-
man soul. Finally, he points to a third difference, insofar as in the Chris-
tian understanding our present happiness lies in “the felicity which is by
hope of the future world” (OFB IV p. 135; cf. La Primaudaye 1586, Au-
thor to the Reader). This is informed by Bacon’s conception of the present
age as a saeculum bounded by the Fall and a future world.
A little further on, under the speciªc heading of De Cultura Animi, Ba-
con enumerates a number of stages in the “medicining of the mind” which
include, crucially, knowledge of what he refers to as the “diseases and
inªrmities of the mind which are no other than the perturbations and dis-
tempers of the affections” (OFB IV p. 149). He thus rehearses the com-
monplace that self-knowledge is the beginning of the philosophical task,
and his reference to “perturbations” draws directly on the Stoic idea that a
primary target of philosophical therapy is the disturbances of the mind
caused by opinion and false judgement. We ªnd similar themes in the tra-
dition of English moral psychology represented by Timothy Bright,
Thomas Wright, and Thomas Rogers. However, unlike these authors, Ba-
con makes no reference in this context to the corruption of human nature
by the Fall, nor to the idea that that primeval event was the primary
source of the disorder of the passions.10 But if he makes no reference to sa-
cred history here, Bacon nonetheless declares that this whole discussion of
the cure of the mind is primarily the province of theology: “the cure of
mens Minds belongeth to sacred Divinity,” to which moral philosophy is a
humble handmaid (OFB IV p. 146).11 Elsewhere he adds that there is a
kind of culture of the mind that is “more accurate and elaborate than the
rest” and which requires the promotion of good in the mind and the extir-
pation of evil. The former calls for “vowes or Constant resolutions, and ob-
servances or exercises which . . . keepe the mynd in continual obedience.”
The latter requires “some kind of Redemption, or expiation of that which
is past; and an Inception of account de Novo for the time to come.” And
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science” may be a reference to puritan casuistry, in spite of Bacon’s reservations about casu-
istry. See Perkins 1604.
10. See e.g., Bright 1586, p. 119; Rogers 1576, Preface; Wright 1601, pp. 2–3. Cf. La
Primaudaye 1586, pp. 13, 171; 1618, pp. 6, 12, 13, 20f., 589, 866, 889. See also Harri-
son, 2007.
11. This is a reworking of the medieval commonplace of philosophy as handmaiden to
theology. Bacon invokes the same metaphor for natural philosophy which “is rightly
given” to religion “as her most faithful servant” (OFB XI, p. 145).
this belongs to the sphere of the “sacred and religious” (OFB IV, p. 153).12
In fact, Bacon’s references to future hopes and to an expiation of past trans-
gressions signal his intention to locate the whole discussion within the
context of sacred history, of a past Fall and a future eschatological hope—
elements necessarily absent from the classical treatments.
In concluding his discussion of moral philosophy and cultura animi, Ba-
con identiªes Christian charity as a key virtue. Heathen and profane treat-
ments of the virtues have but “a shadowe of that divine state of mind
which Religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto; by imprinting
upon their soules Charity” (OFB IV, p. 154). A mind inºamed with char-
ity, he continues, conduces more to the perfection of the mind “than all
the doctrine of morality can do.” In contrast to Lipsius, who identiªed
constancy as the virtue to be sought, for Bacon it was charity that both ex-
alts the mind and “doth settle and compose it” (OFB IV, p. 155). In this,
he also sides with Augustine against the classical elevation of wisdom as
the goal of intellectual and moral endeavours (Augustine De doctrina
Cristiana, II.xlii.63; I.xxxv.39; II.vii.10 [PL 34, pp. 65, 34, 39]).
In sum, the medicine of the mind is offered here as the practical com-
ponent of a moral philosophical project that for Bacon is cautiously placed
within an overarching theological context—much more so than in his ear-
lier recommendations to Roger Manners. As we would expect, it focuses
on the practicalities of the moral life and, as is also characteristic of Ba-
con’s oeuvre, identiªes a number of topics to be more fully explored. It has
been plausibly argued that the desiderata of the Advancement are subse-
quently taken up in the work for which Bacon was best known in his own
age—the Essayes (Crane 1972). Thus, for example, the desire for discus-
sions of the passions is met by the essays “Of Envy,” “Of Love,” “Of Super-
stition,” “Of Vain-Glory,” “Of Anger,” and so on. Bacon also devotes an
essay to “Goodness and Goodness of Nature,” where he again identiªes the
theological virtue charity as the greatest “of the all the virtues and digni-
ties of the mind,” “the affecting of the Weale of Men, which is that the
Grecians call Philanthropia” (OFB XV, p. 38).
All of this is somewhat consistent with existing understandings of
cultura animi which restrict its application to moral cultivation of the indi-
vidual and the production of good citizens. The question remains whether
this cultura animi project might also be related to natural philosophy, and
if so how. My suggestion is that Bacon’s application of this tradition to
natural philosophy—an intention incipient in the Advancement of Learning
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12. Bacon may have in mind Basil’s suggestion that repentance is the medicine of the
soul. Basil the Great 1950, p. 436. Cf. Cyril of Alexandria 1983, p. 592.
and conspicuous in the Novum Organum—is made possible by three, re-
lated innovations. First is Bacon’s reworking of the virtue of charity,
which, as we have seen, he already extends to human welfare generally,
and for which advances in learning are proposed as a means. The virtue of
charity thus provides a link between moral and natural philosophy. Sec-
ond, Bacon embeds his proposed cure for the mind in a distinctive under-
standing of sacred history. This history extends back to the primeval past
that takes in the Fall of man, the onset of the diseases of the mind and the
loss of knowledge that ensued; it takes in an immediate present, under-
stood as a time ordained by providence for a reform of learning and a be-
ginning of the restoration of the losses of the Fall; and it looks forward to a
future in which elements of our fully redeemed condition are anticipated
here on earth. These historical contexts are informed by Bacon’s reading of
the Genesis narratives of creation and fall, his interpretation of the biblical
imperatives to “have dominion,” and his understanding of the original vo-
cation of Adam as a cultivator of the earth. Third, and related to these
points, Bacon combines a Protestant notion of vocation and the sanctity of
mundane professions with a renaissance elevation of the vita activa and the
philosopher’s civic responsibility, and with these in mind seeks to invest
natural philosophy with a new status and signiªcance.
Cultura Animi and Sacred History
One way of linking the moral project of the cultura animi with natural phi-
losophy would be to consider whether “the diseases and inªrmities of the
mind” had intellectual as well as moral consequences, in which case their
remediation would be integral to the natural philosophical project. It can
be argued that this is what Bacon attempts in Novum organum. The title of
the work itself offers a major clue. Logic—the subject matter of Aristotle’s
“old” Organon—was often considered to be the most appropriate cure for
the ills of the mind. Bacon himself observes that the received body of logic
is a “medicine” that “just cannot cope with the disease, and it is not even
free of the disease itself” (OFB XI, p. 19). But more directly, Bacon takes
up the medical metaphor in the Novum organum along with a number of
the features of the programme outlined in the cultura animi section of the
Advancement. In three key successive aphorisms of Book 1 of the Novum
organum, Bacon speaks of the difªculties encountered in “discovering and
cultivating sciences”:
the difªculty arose not from things themselves, over which we have
no control, but from the human intellect and its use and applica-
tion, which is something being capable of treatment and cure. It
would be best then to expose these errors. (OFB XI, p. 153)
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In the two preceding aphorisms Bacon provides the context, within sacred
history, for his proposed instauration of learning. Thus in §92 he identiªes
as obstacles to the progress of science these things: “nature’s obscurity,
life’s shortness, the senses’ deceits, our fallibility of judgement, the intrac-
tability of experiments and the like” (OFB XI, p. 149).13 These impedi-
ments, as it turns out, were traditionally regarded as having been conse-
quences of the Fall of man (Harrison 2007, pp. 155–72). In the aphorism
that follows (§93), Bacon makes his celebrated reference to the prophecy
of Daniel:
we must not forget the prophecy of Daniel concerning the last ages
of the world: that Many shall go to and fro and knowledge shall be in-
creased, which manifestly hints and signify that it was fated (i.e.
Providence so arranged it), that thorough exploration of the world
(which so many long voyages have apparently achieved or are pres-
ently achieving) and the growth of the sciences would meet in the
same age. (OFB XI, p. 151)
The historical context in which Bacon here locates the cultura animi has
both backward and forward looking elements. This motif of a divinely-
ordained augmentation of learning appears in the frontispiece of the 1620
edition of the Great Instauration, which bears the same epigraph: “Multi
pertransibunt et augebitur scientia.”14 Bacon had earlier made a similar refer-
ence in Valerius Terminus and Advancement of Learning to this prophecy of
Daniel and to the prospects for “further discovery of knowledge” in his
own time (SEH III, p. 221; OFB IV, p. 71). These prophetic references to
a reform of learning were reinforced by Bacon’s providentialist reading of
the sixteenth-century reforms of religion, ªrst noted in the Advancement,
where Bacon refers to the fact that Providence has ordained that the refor-
mation of religious abuses would be accompanied by “a renovation and
new spring of all other knowledges.” He adds that these extend even to
Catholic territories: “we see the Jesuits, who partly in themselves, and
partly by the emulation and provocation of their example, have much
quickened and strengthened the state of Learning” (OFB IV, p. 37).
Bacon closes Novum organum with a summary of the sacred historical
context, and the imperatives which, in his view, that history calls for:
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13. As Guido Giglioni has pointed out to me, this statement also echoes Hippocrates’
ªrst aphorism: “Life is short, the Art long, opportunity ºeeting, experiment treacherous,
judgment difªcult” (Hippocrates 1943, p. 99).
14. Dan. 12:4. In fact the Vulgate reads “plurimi pertransibunt et multiplex erit scientia”,
which Bacon accurately cites in Advancement. Whether the change of wording was deliber-
ate is not clear. See Farrington 1967, p. 132. On the use of this passage in Puritan sermons,
see Webster 1975, pp. 9–12.
For by his fall man lost both his state of innocence and his com-
mand over created things. However, both of these losses can to
some extent be made good even in this life, the former by religion
and faith, the latter by the arts and sciences. For the curse did not
quite put creation into a state of unremitting rebellion, but by vir-
tue of that injunction In the sweat of thy face thou eat thy bread, it is
now by various labours (nor for such disputations and the idle cere-
monies of magic) at length and to some degree mitigated to allow
man his bread or, in other words, for the use of human life. (OFB
XI, p. 447)
The business of redemption was to be understood not simply in tradi-
tional soteriological terms, according to which religion provides a cure for
the soul, but is extended to incorporate the material and the mundane. A
speciªc case that exempliªes this general approach is Bacon’s interest in
the prolongation of life. In the Historia vitae & mortis he writes that: “al-
though we Christians aspire and thirst after the promised land, yet in the
meantime it will be a mark of Divine Favour if, in our Pilgrimage in this
world’s wastes, these our shoe and clothes (our frail bodies, that is), be as
little worn out as possible” (OFB XIII, p. 143). Bacon believes that mor-
tality, a consequence of the Fall, can thus be partially ameliorated even in
the present state. More broadly, Bacon offers a novel concept of progress
and, equally importantly, a setting out of the conditions that would make
such progress imaginable. Part of the purpose of Advancement of Learning
and Novum organum is to offer religious legitimacy for this idea of progress
(Harrison 2012; Le Doeuff 1991, p. xx). The model on offer is breathtak-
ingly ambitious, grounded in a particular understanding of the course of
history, but with a strong this-wordly orientation.
Part of what drives this programme is a new reading of the Genesis nar-
ratives of Creation and Fall, along with a reworking of the motifs of do-
minion and cultivation found there. In essence, this amounted to an insis-
tence that the exercise of a psychological self-dominion be projected
outwards onto the world. It is striking that the exegetical tradition from
the Fathers onwards had tended to psychologize the “have dominion” im-
peratives of Genesis, suggesting that after the Fall the kind of dominion of
which the human race stood most in need was the imposition of control
over fractious passions (Harrison 1998b, 1999). Adam’s dominion over
the beasts represented the dominion of reason over the passions. Following
the Fall, the passions rebelled against reason, much as the wild beasts
had rebelled against Adam. According to this exegetical tradition, the re-
establishment of dominion over the beasts was understood to be a process
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of moral formation: the establishment of an inner dominion through the
practice of spiritual exercises.
Without wishing to over-generalise, we can say that Protestant exe-
getes reject both the hermeneutical tradition of allegorizing and the way
in which the Genesis narratives had been used to underpin the “monkish”
virtues associated with the contemplative life (Harrison 1998a, pp. 205–
65). Luther and Calvin both noted that Adam had been placed in the Gar-
den of Eden to work, and they insisted that created things were there to be
used (Luther 1958, p. 103; Calvin 2003a, p. 125). Luther stated that the
religious life involves “using” the world and insisted that the true Chris-
tian must “have dealings and hold intercourse with his fellows, to join
them in all temporal affairs” (Luther 2000, p. 281). Calvin, too, famously
advocated employing one’s abilities in the service of the common good:
Those who employ usefully whatever God has committed to them
are said to be engaged in trading. The life of the godly, is justly
compared to trading, for they ought naturally to exchange and bar-
ter with each other, in order to maintain intercourse; and the indus-
try with which every man discharges the ofªce assigned him, the
calling itself, the power of acting properly, and other gifts, are reck-
oned to be so many kinds of merchandise; because the use or object
which they have in view is, to promote mutual intercourse among
men. Now the gain which Christ mentions is general usefulness,
which illustrates the glory of God. (Calvin 2003b, p. 443)
This passage offers a brief account of Calvin’s “utilitarianism,” and
his insistence that one’s labour is to be directed towards “utility,” “proªt,”
and “advantage.” These, in turn, promote the good of society and the
glory of God.15 Moreover, this participation in society is charged as a spe-
ciªc duty that can help partially restore an original prelapsarian order
(Calvin 2003c, pp. 350f.). This understanding of the sanctity of mundane
work and its justiªcation in terms of a particular reading of Genesis were
to become prominent features of Bacon’s justiªcation for a natural philoso-
phy that was similarly directed towards a partial restoration of a prelapsar-
ian state of affairs. It is signiªcant that Augustine, Luther, and Calvin all
speak of “using” the world. But for Augustine this use consists in contem-
plative practice by means of which we ascend from the visible elements of
the creation to the invisible (Augustine, De doctrina Christiana 1. 2, 2).
The “use” of the world in this sense is an integral part of the contempla-
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15. On this notion and its inºuence in Early Modern England see Little 1970, esp.
pp. 57–62. Cf. Weber [1904–5] 2001, p. 265, n. 33; Harbison 1964, pp. 249–70.
tive life, and is wholly consistent with the Patristic spiritual readings of
“cultivation” and “dominion.” Luther and Calvin both suggest a more ma-
terial use of the world, sanctioned they believe, by a literal reading of
Genesis. It is precisely this reading that Bacon adopts, but with this added
element: it is a new natural philosophy (rather than a platonically-inspired
allegoresis) that will unlock the true signiªcance of the created world. This
is why Bacon insists that we can ªnd God’s power in nature, but not his
image. Accordingly, our “use” of nature must be more a matter of action
than contemplation: “as if,” he writes, “there were to be sought in knowl-
edge a couch, whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit; or terrace,
for a wandering a variable mind to walk up and down with a fair pros-
pect.” Rather than adopt this quiescent contemplative approach, we must
scrutinise nature to uncover “a rich Store-house, for the glorie of the Cre-
ator, and the reliefe of Mans estate” (OFB IV, p. 32). In so doing, we re-
verse the curse placed on human endeavours at the Fall. Knowledge is to
be sought, not for “the quiet of resolution” but for “a restitution and rein-
vesting (in great part) of man to the sovereignty and power . . . which he
had in his ªrst state of creation” (SEH III, p. 222).
In seventeenth century England we encounter many similar references
to the need for knowledge to bear fruit. Thomas Jackson declared that “all
knowledge must be measured by the use or end.” He illustrates this with
the cultivation metaphor. Observing that the husbandman needs “experi-
mental skill,” he rehearses the Augustinian motif of God as the cultivator:
“our Sauiour tels vs his father is an husbandman, and is best gloriªed by
such fruites as we shall bring forth vnto saluation, (the true end of Chris-
tian knowledge)” (Jackson 1615, pp. 85, 86). Edward Waterhouse also
stressed this link between the cultivation of the mind, and cultivation of
the earth:
But when the World grew old in sin, as in age, he left them to la-
bour out their way to life and light, and to see the toyl sin had ex-
posed them to; while, as nothing naturally grew in the Earth, but
weeds, bryars and thorns, without cultivation, so in the mind noth-
ing of true coelestial and virtuous tendency could be or abide, with-
out the polishment of art, and the labour of searching after it.
(1653, p. 5)16
In a similar vein, Puritan writer John Flavel wrote in Husbandry Spiritual-
ized that: “By a skilful and industrious improvement of the creatures . . .
we might have a fuller taste of heaven” (Flavell 1674, Sig. A2v).
Common though these general ideas might have been, Bacon’s “geor-
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16. See also Hammond 1684, vol. 4, p. 619; Blount 1692, p. 76; Denny 1653, p. 43.
gics” involve a quite explicit application of the motif of cultivation to nat-
ural philosophy. This seems original. However, this is not a natural philos-
ophy divorced from the realm of the virtues—the original context for the
cultura animi—for the virtues themselves are understood as embodied in
an active life, not in the political sphere but in the pursuit of new kind of
natural philosophy. The success of this redeployment ultimately rests
upon Bacon’s marshalling of exegetical resources to interpret the Genesis
narratives as sanctioning a new engagement with nature, along with his
insistence that the fruits of natural philosophy are to be identiªed with
the fruits of the cardinal Christian virtue, charity (Vickers 1984; Wata-
nabe 1992; Harrison 2001). These two features of the programme distin-
guish Bacon’s use of the idea of cultura animi from that of his Stoic and
Neostoic sources, and it is in this sense that his culture of the mind is Au-
gustinian. Of course, it could be reasonably objected that much of Bacon’s
thought is redolent of Pelagianism. But if the contrast in approaches to
the culture of the soul is understood in terms of the two opposed concep-
tions with which this paper began, Bacon’s sympathies lie more with the
North African Church Father than with Cicero.
Conclusion
All of this suggests a number of further questions for investigation. I have
proposed particular lines of inºuence on Bacon’s thought which seem
plausible. Yet the business of identifying proximate sources remains in-
complete. It would be helpful to know in detail about Bacon’s patristic
sources, about his access to biblical commentary, and his familiarity with
works of the Protestant reformers. Moving beyond the inºuence of the
scriptural tradition, it is also important to gauge the relative weight of
biblical narratives against the classical sources which are also ubiquitous
in Bacon’s works. The ideal of labor as represented in Virgil’s Georgics,
along with his presentation of competing conceptions of the happy man,
and Hesiod’s “Fall,” with its message that necessity is the mother of inven-
tion, offer examples of other possible inºuences for Bacon’s reshaping of
natural philosophy. Consideration might also be given to broader ques-
tions of interpretation, such as adjudicating between Le Doeuff and
Farrington on whether Bacon promotes a natural philosophy on the model
of gardening and agriculture (Le Doeuff 1990) or presages an “industrial
science” (Farrington 1973). Certainly, on the basis of the present analysis,
the former seems more likely. A further question concerns Bacon’s concep-
tion of history, and the manner in which it differs from both Stoic fate and
Calvinist theological determinism.17 It is also still somewhat unclear
Perspectives on Science 153
17. Bacon seems to change from a (Calvinist) Prelapsarian (God preordained the Fall) to
whether the culture of the mind is that which makes possible a reformed
natural philosophy, or whether it is the practices of experimental natural
philosophy, on the analogy of spiritual exercises, that constitute the cul-
ture of the mind. My suggestion would be that for Bacon it is the former,
although we encounter instances of the latter in justiªcations of experi-
mental natural philosophy that emanate from the apologists for the Royal
Society in the 1660s and 1670s. But the idea of experimental natural phi-
losophy as a regimen of self-discipline seems worth pursuing further.
Finally, and less tentatively, these considerations reinforce the claims
made by Corneanu (2011) and Jalobeanu (2010) in other contexts to the
effect that the cultura animi tradition plays an important role in Bacon’s
conception of the role of natural philosophy. I also hope to have shown
that this role is generally consistent with the pattern of the emergence of
early modern natural philosophy that I have set out elsewhere (Harrison
2007).
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